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GROUP DEFAMATION
Geoffrey R. Stone*

Late this spring, the Illinois General Assembly
consideredthe enactment of legislationdesigned to
re-institute the crime of "group defamation" in Illinois. On June 6, 1 had an opportunity to testify
before the Judiciary II Committee of the Illinois
House of Representatives concerning the propriety
and constitutionalityof Senate Bill 1811, the proposed legislation.t Although sympathetic to the

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
tSenate Bill 1811, as amended by its sponsors in the Illinois House
of Representatives, provided:
(a) Elements of Offense. A person commits criminal group
defamation when such person demonstrates or exhibits in any
public street, highway, sidewalk, alley, park or parking lot and
knowingly displays any sign, slogan, uniform or symbol which
portrays, states or implies depravity, criminality or unchastity
of a class of persons of any race, color, creed or religion or
threatens the life, liberty or property of any class of persons by
reason of their race, color, creed or religion, which sign, slogan,
uniform or symbol exposes the persons of any race, color, creed
or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy and which is intended so to do or which islikely to be productive of a breach of
the peace or riot. No demonstration or exhibition shall be
unlawful under this Section solely by reason of the hostility or
dislike which such demonstration or exhibition arouses in any
person or persons who observe it.
(b) Penalty. Criminal group defamation is a Class B misdemeanor.
(c) Injunction. Any public official or any person affected by an imminent violation of subsection (a)above may maintain an action in the circuit court to restrain such a violation.
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specific concerns underlyingOhe bill, it was my view
that the bill, as drafted, simply could not satisfy
the rigorous demands of the Mrst Amendment.
Mat follows is a slightly edited version of my
remarks to the Committee.
At first glance, the notion that "group defamation"
should be suppressed seems perfectly sensible. It is,
no doubt, only common sense to recognize that
speech "which portrays, states or implies depravity,
criminality or unchastity of a class of persons of any
race, color, creed or religion" is in at least many instances abusive and, indeed, despicable. And the
common sense urge to suppress such speech may
seem especially compelling when it "exposes the
persons of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy" or when it "is likely to be
productive of a breach of the peace or riot." At the
same time, however, the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, prohibiting as it
does the making of any "law abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press," cautions that we must not accede too hastily to the apparent dictates of common
sense when freedom of expression is at stake. It is, of
course, elementary that the principle of freedom of
speech lies at the very core of the American political
system, for it is through the free and open exchange
of all sorts of ideas and information that the citizen
must seek to discover the truth and must seek to
make those critical decisions of policy which, in a
democratic society, are reserved for the citizen to
make for himself.
Given the central importance of free speech for our
political system, the exercise of the right must be
granted ample breathing space if the system itself is
to survive and flourish. As the Supreme Court has
recognized, the First Amendment embodies "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open...."I Indeed, the Court has
declared that "a function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
'New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocathie and challenging. It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea." 2 This does not mean, of course, that the
right to freedom of speech is absolute - that it may
never be regulated or restricted. It does mean,
however, that any effort to restrict speech because of
its content, in order to pass constitutional muster, ordinarily must at the very least be narrowly drawn,
carefully limited, and justified by clearly compelling
governmental interests.3
This extraordinarily speech-protective standard is
thought necessary because such restrictions, if permitted, tend to skew the "marketplace of ideas" and
to distort the processes of public decision-making.
Moreover, as experience teaches, the use of any less
exacting standard inevitably results in the
widespread suppression of unpopular and dissenting
views. During World War I, for example, there was
considerable opposition to the war and to the draft.
The government, in an effort to suppress the expression of such criticism, brought almost two thousand
prosecutions against critics of the government's
policies. The courts, not yet sensitive to the dynamics
of a system of free expression, routinely convicted on
the theory that such speech might have the tendency
to obstruct the war and the draft. The net effect was
the suppression of much dissent. Under this "bad tendency" standard, "[iIt became criminal to advocate
heavier taxation instead of bond issues, to state that
conscription was unconstitutional though the
Supreme Court had not yet held it valid, to say that
the sinking of merchant vessels was legal, to urge
that a referendum should have preceded our declaration of war, to say that war was contrary to the teach'Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
3It should be noted that we are dealing here with a restriction on
speech because of its content. The Supreme Court has generally ap.
plied a somewhat less stringent standard in ruling on the constitu.
tionality of restrictions that apply to all speech, without regard to
content. That standard is not in any way at issue here. Compare, eg.,
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), with, eg.. Police Dept v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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ings of Christ."4 Similarly, the Supreme Court's early
experimentation with a "reaspnableness" standard
resulted in unjustified and daigerous restrictions on
speech. 5 Finally, it should be noted that the dangers
are particularly acute when the speech we seek to
suppress consists of the key tenet, slogan or symbol of
a dissident political group. For in such cases, the
members of that group will as often as not go to
prison as a matter of principle rather than abandon
the tenet, slogan or symbol. The practical effect, then,
is to eliminate, not only the offensive or undesirable
speech, but the group itself - including whatever
valuable ideas it might have to offer. This, surely, is a
lesson of our efforts to suppress the Communist advocacy of "violent revolution." Thus, we have learned
over time that the system of free expression is extraordinarily complex and delicate, and that if the
guarantee of the First Amendment is to remain viable, suppression of speech because of its content must
ordinarily be prohibited except in the most compelling circumstances.
As drafted, Senate Bill 1811 permits the suppres.
sion of speech "which portrays, states or implies
depravity, criminality or unchastity of a class of persons of any race, color, creed or religion" if either of
two conditions is satisfied. First, the bill provides
that such speech may be suppressed if it "exposes the
persons of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy."G This aspect of the bill
seems to be directed at the concern that group
defamation can, over time, have a corrosive impact
upon societal attitudes, contributing ultimately to
4Z. Chafee,FREE SPEECHINTHE UNITED STATKs 51(1941).

5See, eg., Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). See also Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
6I must confess that I do not have the faintest idea as to how this
condition is to be applied in practice. What, if anything, does this condition add to the bill's initial description of group defamation? How
is a judge or jury to determine whether, in any given case, this condition is satisfied? Given this ambiguity, how is a speaker to know when
he crosses the line and incurs a riskof criminal liability? In my judgment, this aspect of the bill is so confusing and imprecise as, by cur.
rent standards, to be unconstitutionally vague. Cf. Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971).
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racism, bigotry and intolerance, and that the consequences of such attit des may be hurtful and, in the
long run, perhaps disastrous for the members of the
defamed group. This concern is, beyond question, a
legitimate one. It would, indeed, be naive in the extreme to deny that such speech can at least potentially have such an effect. No one need be reminded of
the horrors that were unleashed by the use of hatemongering propaganda only forty years ago in Nazi
Germany. The question remains, however, not
whether the concern of this aspect of the bill is legitimate but, rather, whether the suppression of speech
is, in our system of government, a proper and permissible way to deal with that concern. The answer, I
submit, is an emphatic "no."
However serious the potential consequences of
group defamation may be, they are, in the end,
remote, indirect and uncertain. Thus, any attempt to
suppress such speech for these reasons is, in truth,
simply another manifestation of the dangerous and
discredited "bad tendency" standard, to which I
referred earlier. As Justice Brandeis observed some
fifty years ago, the basic theory of our Constitution is
that, except in the most extraordinary circumstances,
"the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones" not suppression.? Unless the danger is clear, substantial and imminent, the matter must be left to the continued processes of public debate and discussion.
There are, of course, dangers in such a theory, but in
the long run the dangers of suppression are thought
to be more threatening to our society than the
dangers of speech. "That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution." In the words of the Supreme
Court, "[I]t is this sort of hazardous freedom - this
kind of openness - that is the basis of our national
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society." 9 Thus, the proper and permissible way for government in our political system
'Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
'Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holnes, J., dis.
senting).
g1inker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508-509 (1969).
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to deal with this sort of speech is not to attempt suppression, which in any event will simply give greater
publicity to the speech and perhaps create martyrs,
but to expose it for what it is - to facilitate the opportunities for counter-speech, to educate our citizens
in the ways of tolerance, and to teach by its own example. Therein lies the course of greatest safety for
us all.
This does not end the matter, however, for the suppression of speech which exposes "persons of any
race, color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy" might arguably be viewed, not only as an
tAffort to forestall the possible long-range consequences of group defamation, but also as an effort
to protect citizens against any emotional harm that
might be caused by their very exposure to statements
defaming the groups to which they belong. It seems
doubtful that this is in fact a purpose of this aspect of
the bill, for if that is its real purpose it would almost
surely contain some requirement that a member of
the defamed group actually read or hear the statement at issue. More importantly, this is simply not a

sufficiently compelling interest to justify the suppression of otherwise protected expression. The Supreme
Court has long adhered to the view "that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not
be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." 10 This is,
indeed, a fundamental precept of First Amendment
analysis. There may, of course, be a difference between causing "offense" and causing "emotional
harm." That difference, though, is at best one of
degree - it can neither be defined with clarity nor
applied with consistency. Acceptance of causation of
emotional harm as a permissible justification for the
suppression of speech might in practical effect provide a lever for judges and jurors to censor all sorts of
unorthodox and unpopular ideas. It is not, in short, a
difference that can safely be incorporated into a sensitive and realistic analysis of the First Amendment.
"'Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). See, ed., Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974): Bachellar v. Maryland, 397
U.S. 564,567 (1970); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 551 (1965); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,535 (1963): Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268. 284 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The second ground for the suppression of group
defamation offered by Senate Bill 1811 is that such
speech may be prohibited if it "is likely to be productive of a breach of the peace or riot." There can be no
doubt that government has a legitimate interest in
the preservation of order. But, as always, restrictions
on speech are permissible only when absolutely
necessary. Thus, in its unanimous 1969 decision in
Brandenburgv. Ohio, the Supreme Court, for reasons
similar to those already addressed, held in no uncertain terms that even the express advocacy of crime
cannot constitutionally be proscribed unless "such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."" Senate Bill 1811 is, on its face, flatly
incompatible with this command of Brandenburg.
The problem, however, runs deeper. The Court in
Brandenburg was concerned with the situation in
which a speaker expressly urges others to engage in
unlawful conduct. The breaches of the peace and
riots covered by this bill, on the other hand, will
almost invariably be directed againstthe speaker by
a hostile audience. We are dealing, in other words,
with what Professor Harry Kalven termed the dilemma of the "heckler's veto." To elevate the heckler's
veto to a principle of First Amendment interpretation
would, in practical effect, grant censorial power to
any group with the desire and wherewithal to snuff
out any other group's or individual's right to speak
through the use of real or threatened acts of violent
opposition. This is simply inconsistent with all that
the First Amendment stands for. Thus, if we are ever
to grant the heckler his veto, we should do so only
when the police, after taking all reasonable
measures, are dearly unable to prevent the imminent
and likely disorder, and the speaker refuses at that
time to obey a police order to stop his speech."
The final question that must be considered is
whether group defamation, as defined by this bill,
"1395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

IsSeeGregoryv. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111(1969); Cox v.Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229(1963). The
reference to the problem of the hostile audience in the final sentence
of sub-section (a), which was added by the House sponsors, while
helpful, is anbiguous and, in any event, seems not to meet the standards outlined above.
7

constitutes one of those special and limited categories of speech, such as obsceniti, false statements of
fact, and fighting wordst1 which the Supreme Court
has found to be of such low value in terms of the
historical, philosophical and political purposes of the
First Amendment as to be exempt from the or.
dinarily-stringent standards of review we have thus
far examined. Any attempt to answer this question
must begin with the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in
Beauharnais v. illinois.14 Beauharnais, president of
the White Circle League of America, participated in
the publication and distribution of a rather lengthy
leaflet, a portion of which was in the form of a petition to the mayor and city council of Chicago, calling
for a halt to racial integration of housing. At one
point, the petition stated that, "If persuasion and the
need to prevent the white race from being
mongrelized by the Negro will not unite us, then the
aggressions, rapes, robberies, knives, guns and mari.
juana of the Negro surely will." Because of this
characterization of blacks, Beauharnais was charged
with the crime of group defamation. He was
prosecuted under a former Illinois statute, quite
similar to Senate Bill 1811, which was ultimately
withdrawn from the State's Criminal Code in 1961.15
'The "fighting words" doctrine, itshould be noted, has no application in this context for at least three reasons. First, that doctrine has
been limited, from its inception, to the use of personal insults or
epithets which are intended and understood, not as communication,
but as verbal assaults. Second, the doctrine contains an implicit requirement of likely and imminent danger, in that the speech must be
such as to cause the average addressee to respond with violence. See,
edg., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). And third,
the Court has carefully and consistently limited the doctrine solely to
face-to.face encounters where the speech is directed at a particular,
individual addressee. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). Although this third
requirement may at first glance seem artificial, it is in fact an emential component of the doctrine. For unlike personal insults addressed
to a particular individual, statements critical of a group addressed to
a general audience are by their very nature generalized and therefore
of potentially greater importance to public debate. Finally, it should
be noted that the Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction on the
basis of the "fighting words" doctrine in some thirty-five years. See.
edg., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130 (1974); but cf. Lucas v. Arkansas, 423 U.S. 807 (1975).
14343 U.S. 250 (1952).
3

' See Smith-Hurd, Ill. Stat. Ann. (1949), chap. 38, § 471. The 1961
revision merged the three prior criminal libel laws into a single brief
statute keyed to breach of peace. See Smith-Hurd, Ill. Stat Ann.
(1961), chap. 38Ai1 27-1, 27-2, and the committee comments.
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At this trial, Beauharnais offered to prove the truth
of the statement by showing that crimes were more
frequent in black districts. The trial judge rejected
this offer of proof, because under then-prevailing Illinois law, truth alone was not a defense. Rather, in
order to make out a defense to a charge of group
defamation, it was incumbent upon the defendant to
prove, not only that the statement was true, but also
that it was published with "good motives." The trial
judge also refused to instruct the jury that it could
convict only if it found that the statement created a
clear and present danger of some serious evil.
Beauharnais was convicted. The Supreme Court, by
the slim margin of a single vote, and over the vehement dissents of Justices Black, Douglas, Reed and
Jackson,' affirmed.
In my view, and in the view of most courts and
commentators who have addressed the question in
recent years, 7 Beauharnais was untenable at the
time it was decided and, in any event, is no longer
controlling authority today. In the quarter-century
since Beauhamais, the Supreme Court has not in a
single instance relied upon that decision as a con.
trolling precedent. Although that fact, standing
alone, is surely not dispositive of the point, it does indicate the degree of respect accorded Beauharnais by
the Court itself. Moreover, it must be emphasized
'6Justice Jackson, it should be noted, had recently returned from
Nuremburg, where he had served as Chief United States Prosecutor
at the War Crimes Trials. Jackson was thus particularly attuned to
the possible dangers of group defamation and, indeed, he had pre.
viously expressed his concern over that issue in several prior deci.
sions. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 29, 296-314 (1961) (Jackson,
J., dissenting); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13-37 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). It is instructive, then, that in Beauharnais
Jackson felt that the effort to suppress such speech went too far,
because it did not allow for the defense of truth or the application of
the clear and present danger standard, See 343 U.S., at 287-305
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
"See, eg., Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n. 14 (th
Cir. 1973); Anti-Defamation league of B'nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403
F.2d 169, 174 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion); Colin v.
1978): T. Emerson, THE
Smith, 447 F.Supp. 676 94-8 (N. Dist. 111,
Sy.rreuor Fasomor EXPREMION 393-97 (1970); H. Kalven,
THE NRGROANDTHE FRUr AMBNDMer 7.64 (1966); Bogen, The
Supreme Court' Interpretationof the Guarmntee of Freedom of
Speech, 35 Md. L Rev. 55,603-04 (1976). But see Arkes, Civility and
the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups,
1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281.
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that Beauharnais was decide4 at a time when the
Court, relative to the present, *as rather notably in.
sensitive to the need for jealous protection of the
right of free speech. To cite just one example other
than Beauharnais, the preceding year the Court
upheld the convictions of the leaders of the Communist Party under the Smith Act.'8 That decision
has long been the subject of spirited criticism and, indeed, has as a practical matter been discredited by
the Court itself.'9 In the twenty-six years since
Beauharnais,the Court has made extensive, indeed
revolutionary, doctrinal changes in its interpretation
and application of the First Amendment. And although it is impossible even to begin to trace those
developments here, 20 it seems only fair to say that
those changes leave Beauharnais looking a bit antique.
Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court
has flatly rejected the underlying premise of the
Beauharnais decision. The Court in Beauharnais
rested its analysis squarely upon its conclusion that
libelous utterances are not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech ... ."21 Accordingly,
there was no need to worry about the truth or falsity
of the statement, and no need to consider the applicability of the clear and present danger standard.
Some twelve years later, however, in its landmark
'"Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For an additional
example, see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
IOSee Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Ogns of Modern Mrst Amendment
Doctrine: Some ragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719 (1976);
Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for AU Seasons, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 151 (1975).
2'To cite just a few examples, see, eg.. Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (commercial speech held protected by the First Amendment);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyer advertising
held protected by the First Amendment); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (use of profanity held protected by the First Amendment); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel held
protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (symbolic speech by school students held
protected by the First Amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969) (hyperbolic threat held protected by the First Amendment).
21343
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U.S., at 266.

decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court
declared that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."22 Thus, although New York Times and its
progeny do not tell us precisely how to deal with the
problem of group libel, there can be no doubt that
Beauharnais has been stripped of any doctrinal support. It is, in short, a relic of a bygone era.
Despite all this, there are those who still maintain
that, since the decision has not as yet been expressly
overruled, it remains "good" law. That argument is, to
me, simplistic and unpersuasive. Let us suppose that,
in 1902, the Supreme Court, applying the then accepted principle of "separate but equal," upheld the
constitutionality of racial segregation of a public hos.
pital. It seems to me clearly untenable to maintain
that that decision is still "good" law today, just
because the Supreme Court has not as yet had an opportunity to hold racial segregation in the specific
context of public hospitals unconstitutional.
Beauharnais,like my hypothetical 1902 decision, is
simply no longer "good" law.
Putting Beauharnaisto one side, then, the question
remains whether group defamation, as defined by
this bill, can fairly be said to be of such "low" constitutional value as to be exempt from the ordinarily
stringent standards of First Amendment review. At
the outset, it should be noted that the potential scope
of this bill's applicability is, to say the least, rather
broad. It would seem to reach, not only Mr. Beauharnais, but also, perhaps, a black activist who accuses
whites of being racists; not only Mr. Colin, but also,
perhaps, Anita Bryant; not only the leader of the Ku
Klux Klan, but also, perhaps, a feminist who rails
against the Catholic view on abortion. This bill is
simply not a narrowly drawn, carefully limited
restriction on speech. Although 1811 finds its roots in
the current controversy over Skokie, its language and
effect reach well beyond that situation. That is, indeed, a basic problem with the very concept of group
defamation. It is, however, but the tip of the problem.
Speech "which portrays, states or implies
22376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
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depravity, criminality or uncha tity of a class of persons of any race, color, creed or eligion" may be distasteful, but there can be no dotibt that it is, in many
instances, relevant to issues of general public concern. Although we might prefer that all persons be
treated solely as individuals, rather than as members
of groups, we live in a heterogeneous society consisting of many overlapping but distinct groups. This
diversity is, indeed, one of our greatest strengths as a
nation. Our perceptions of such groups may affect our
views, not only of society generally, but of such controversial issues as affirmative action, busing, crime
control, government aid to parochial schools, abortion, and our treatment of homosexuals. Moreover,
at least some statements prdecribed by this bill may
amount to nothing more than true statements of fact,
such as "Blacks commit a disproportionate number
of crimes," or "American Indians commit a disproportionate number of suicides." Such statements
are valuable, not because they tell us something
"bad" about those groups but, rather, because it is
important to be aware of and to recognize such facts
if society is to understand the causes of the problems
and if it is to attempt to ameliorate them. It is simply
inconceivable to me that true statements of fact, relevant in any way to public debate, can be said to be of
"low" First Amendment value.23 In many other instances, speech propcribed by this bill will consist of
statements of opinion, or efforts at sarcasm, ridicule,
or hyperbole. Such rhetorical devices, although at
times cruel and often in bad taste, have long been
recognized as effective and important techniques of
public debate.24 However unpleasant they might be,
they cannot fairly be said to be outside the realm of
permitted public debate in a genuinely free and open
society. As the Supreme Court has recognized, debate
on public issues may at times be "vehement, caustic"
23Cf Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con.
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
24Indeed, one of the most disturbing features of the Sedition Act of
1798 was that it permitted the suppression of such speech under the
guise of the libel concept. See, eg., lWal of Matthew Lyon for
Seditious Libel, in F. Wharton,

STATE TRIALS OFTHE UNITED

STATES 333(1849); Trial of James T. Callenderfor Seditious Libel,
in id.at 688. Seegenerally,J. Smith, FREEDoMS FErres (1956).
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and unpleasant." Ai4 although "the immediate consequences of this freedom may often appear to be
only verbal tumult, diaiord, and even offensive utterance," these are, "in truth necessary side effects of
the broader enduring values which the process of
open debate permits us to achieve." 6
It is true, of course, that individuals may at times
engage in such speech for "bad" reasons. But speech
that is not on its face of low First Amendment value
cannot magically be transformed into low value
speech because of the intent or motives of the
speaker. Concepts such as intent and motive are extraordinarily slippery, and if they are made the sole
determinants of the distinction between "good" and
"bad" speech they can easily lead to abuse, consciously or unconsciously, by judges and jurors who
are offended by the ideas themselves. This results,
not only in arbitrariness of enforcement, but also in a
substantial chilling of public debate. Moreover, and
perhaps most importantly, as Professor Zechariah
Chafee has observed, "truth is truth, and just as
valuable to the public" regardless of the speaker's
motive or intent.27
There is, finally, one class of statements encompassed within the notion of group defamation which
might, at least arguably, be a legitimate basis for suppression. The Supreme Court has held that "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact."28
Thus, if this bill were re-drafted so as to
apply only to false statements of fact, made with
reckless disregard for the truth, it might well be constitutional. There are, however, at least three possible problems with such a law, and I would like to
note them briefly. First, as the Supreme Court has
observed, "Under the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the comnNew York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

MCohen
2

v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24.25 (1971).

1Z. Chafee, FHun

SPEF.CHINTHE UNITED STArs 5l(1941).

2

"Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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petition of other ideas." Accorbingly, such a law, to
be constitutional, must clearly be limited to false
statements of fact, and may not reach statements of
opinion, sarcasm, ridicule or hyperbole. Second, in
upholding restrictions on false statements of fact, the
Court has dealt primarily with libel of individuals,
where the harm is direct and substantial. In the
group defamation context, the harm is ordinarily
somewhat more remote. It is thus an open question
whether the Court would uphold a restriction on
false statements in such circumstances. Finally, there
may well be serious objections of policy to such a law.
It seems to me unseemly, at best, and dangerous, at
worst, for a judge or jury to find a statement of the
"depravity, criminality or unchastity of a class of
persons of any race, color, creed or religion" to be
true. It might be that the potential costs to society of
such a possibility outweigh any benefits that might be
derived from the law itself.
I should note, in concluding,"o that I have the utmost sympathy with the concerns that underlie this
bill, and have nothing but disdain and contempt for
much of the speech it would prohibit. The First
Amendment, however, renders my judgments on such
matters irrelevant. That is the way it should be, and
it is the way it must be. It is my firm belief that this
bill, as drafted, is in direct violation of the Constitution of the United States. It should not be enacted
into law.

"Id. at 339-40. See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 283-87 (1974) (use of terms like "scab" and "traitor"
cannot be deemed false statements of fact). See generally American
Law Institute, RarTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977);
Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of
Torta, 75 Mich. L Rev. 1621 (1977).
3

Senate Bill 1811 has been amended by its House sponsors so as to
make it applicable to threats as well as to group defamation. This
aspect of the bill seems clearly unconstitutional. Threats directed
against a class of persons merge, practically and analytically, with
the problem of incitement. Indeed, Brandenburg itself dealt, in
reality, with threats rather than with incitement as such. The two
problems are, in this context, so entwined as to be inseparable. Thus,
whatever may be the status under the First Amendment of threats
directed against a particular, named individual, cf.Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), threats against a group must be tested
against the Brandenburg requirement that, in order to justify suppression, the harm must be likely and it must be imminent.
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Although the Illinois Senate had quickly and overwhelmingly approved,Senate Bill 1811, the House
JudiciaryII Committee, at the conclusion of its Jume
6 hearings, voted 16 to 4 against passage of the bill.
One week later, the House as a whole voted not to
discharge the bill from Committee.
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